Ontological relativity and other essays by w v quine

Speaking in a manner reminiscent of traditional epistemology which Quine does not doone may put his point as follows. Such would be the acceptable and reputable sort of similarity concept, if it could be defined.

Willard Van Orman Quine

And how to slice it is what ostension or simple conditioning, however persistently repeated, cannot teach. It would Seem that in such a language what I intend to refer to could only be what I actually refer to.

Ontological relativity does not make an objective account of objects impossible any more than the relativity of motion makes an objective account of physical phenomena impossible. I thus find the object of my reference inscrutable, and I can reenforce the point by reflecting that reference to a rabbit stage is not the only other way of reconstruing reference to a rabbit.

Scientific realism is an answer to a question that apparently arises from beliefs similar to, though surely more sophisticated than, the following.

Instead he tells us that we must first determine whether our terms refer or not before we know the proper way to understand them. A paradigm wholly within the realm of abstract entities is the reduction of numbers to classes.

The deterioration of his short-term memory was so severe that he struggled to continue following arguments. But no such illustration is avail- able for statements about spatiotemporal objects.

Only the second sentence, since it is not sensitive to such differences, is an obser- vation sentence for the whole community; the first sentence is an observation sentence only relative to that part of the com- munity whose members have the requisite past experience.

Certainly when we said that Pegasus was a mythological winged horse we make sense, and moreover we speak the truth! I think the emphasis here on behavior though of course Quine is a behaviorist somewhat misrepresents his position.

The analogous state- ment for similarity would be that two objects are similar and hence in some respect objects of the same kind when and only when something truly predicable of the one is truly predicable of the other, and, hence, when and only when some set that contains the one contains the other.

By the s, he had worked out his "naturalized epistemology" whose aim was to answer all substantive questions of knowledge and meaning using the methods and tools of the natural sciences.

W. V. Quine. Ontological relativity and other essays

Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. Quine maintains that there is no distinction between universally known collateral information and conceptual or analytic truths.

What is given prior to objects is not a set of sensory qualities impressions, sense data from which the existence of objects is inferred, but rather a set of stimulations that prompt assent or dissent to sentences.

Similarities are objective relations in the world in- dependent of our thought and language, and yet any identifica- tion of the objects that are thus related is relative to our language. They might be all the various temporal segments of rabbits. Without such devices all expressions are on a par with mass terms con- strued as sentences.

Ontology is then unavoidably relative, since the stimulatory conditions providing evidence for truth do not determine uniquely how the sentences they confirm should be construed as containing expressions referring to objects.

Without some such prior spacing of qualities, we could never acquire a habit; all stimuli would be equally alike and equally different. He r e a h s his well-known thesis that the ontology of a theory is given by the values over which its bound variables range.

That we have homologous or near- homologous nerve endings assuming I could observe this fact is, as Quine admits, hardly enough. Ontological relativity and other essays. Whether to eliminate reference to the class of all classes not members of themselves is not a pragmatic question, and in forcing this question upon us abstract entities show themselves to be of a different breed from concrete entities.

But what are the same conditions-same sense data or same stimulus? We thus know, for example,! They are explicitly stated, frequently relied on, but never defended.

But now suppose the following thought occurs to me. Two objects are identical when and only when everything truly predicable of the one is truly predicable of the other, and, in terms of sets, when and only when every set that contains the one contains the other.

Until we have noted similarities we have no basis for learning anything.Apr 01,  · Ontological Relativity and Other Essays by W. V. Quine,available at Book Depository with free delivery worldwide.4/5().

Relativity and Other Essays by W. V. Quine Columbia University Press New Yor~ 2 Ontological Relativity I I listened to Dewey on Art as Experience when I was a graduate student in the spring of Dewey was then at Harvard as the first William James Lecturer.

I. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays has ratings and 5 reviews. Tyler said: Quine’s six essays take a pragmatic epistemological approach to meanin 4/5.

W. V. Quine. In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.

Epistemology Naturalized

New York: Columbia University Press () Abstract Epistemology naturalized by WVO Quine Keywords Naturalism Epistemology: Categories Naturalized Epistemology in Epistemology. W. V. O.

Ontological Relativity & Other Essays by Willard Van Orman Quine PDF

Quine in 20th Century PhilosophyAuthor: W. V. Quine. Willard Van Orman Quine (/ k w a"Epistemology Naturalized" in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press: 69– "Truth by Convention," first published in.

Ontological Relativity and Other Essays

Ontological Relativity and Other Essays by W. V. Quine Columbia University Press New York.

Ontological relativity and other essays by w v quine
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